The State of Utah v. Donald Chad Nelson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
The State of Utah v. Donald Chad Nelson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Ralph E. Chamness; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Ronald S. Fujino; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Nelson, No. 930543 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5479
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD CHAD NELSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930543-CA 
P r i o r i t y No. 2 
iZQBH-b Cj 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR BURGLARY, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1990), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TYRONE 
E. MEDLEY, PRESIDING. 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
RALPH E. CHAMNESS (6511) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
FEB 1 7 1994 
Xf- MaryT.Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD CHAD NELSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 930543-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR BURGLARY, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1990), IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TYRONE 
E. MEDLEY, PRESIDING. 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
RALPH E. CHAMNESS (6511) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I DEFENDANT FAILS TO SATISFY THE MARSHALLING 
REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, SHOULD THIS COURT 
DETERMINE TO REACH THE MERITS, THE STATE 
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO 
FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BURGLARY 8 
A. Standard of Review 8 
B. Defendant Has Not Properly Marshalled the 
Evidence 9 
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support 
Defendant's Conviction for Burglary 10 
CONCLUSION 14 
ADDENDA - None 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198 (Utah App. 1989) 7 
People v. Morton. 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) 11 
Rogerson v. Harris. 178 P.2d 397 (Utah 1947) 11 
State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 7 
State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981) 12 
State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 9 
State v. Clements. 488 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971) 12 
State v. Hopkins. 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1961) 11 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980) 10 
State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992), 
aff'd. State v. Larsen. 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Utah 1993) 7 
State v. Lemons. 844 P.2d 378 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 10 
State v. Morgan. 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 1, 8 
State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991) 2, 9, 10 
State v. Sisneros. 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981) 12 
State v. Svddall. 433 P.2d 10 (Utah 1967) 11 
State v. Tellav. 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958) 11 
State v. Valdez. 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Wilson. 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985) 12 
United States v. Powell. 469 U.S. 57 (1984) 12 
ii 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) 1, 2, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1993) 1 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930543-CA 
v. : 
DONALD CHAD NELSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1990) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the evidence sufficient for the jury to find that 
defendant committed the offense of burglary? 
"When appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a jury verdict in a criminal trial, this 
[C]ourt 'must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict and will interfere only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Morgan, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983)). 
"Furthermore, defendant must 'marshal all evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 
472 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 
1207 (Utah App. 1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with burglary of a 
dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1990), and theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (R. I).1 
A jury convicted defendant burglary and acquitted 
defendant of theft (R. 92-3). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines and fees 
(R. 105) . 
xThe State originally charged defendant with a third degree 
felony theft (R. 7). However, the charge was amended to a class 
A misdemeanor after the value of the missing items was 
established (R. 7). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At 1:15 a.m. on January 1, 1993, Denise Robinson left 
her apartment at 50 North "D" Street to attend a New Year's Eve 
party with a friend (R. 269). She locked the door when she left 
(R. 270). She returned to her apartment around 3:00 a.m., 
discovered her door unlocked and her apartment burglarized (R. 
270). She called the police and reported her CD player, worth 
$110, stolen (R. 270). Her roommate, Angela Dennis, also 
reported her stereo, worth between $50 and $200, stolen (R. 281-
82). Ms. Robinson discovered her bathroom window broken open, 
leaving enough room for someone to enter her apartment through 
the window (R. 271-72) . 
The next day, her neighbor Michael Nyer informed her 
that he had observed the break-in of her apartment (R. 244-45, 
273). Ms. Robinson called the police a second time and the 
police questioned Mr. Nyer (R. 273-74, 287-88). Based upon his 
statements, the police arrested defendant, who lived in the 
apartment next to Mr. Nyer and across the hall from Ms. Robinson 
(R. 287-88). Mr. Nyer had known defendant for "perhaps four 
months or five" before the break-in (R. 244). He stated that he 
had "no question at all that it was [defendant]" he saw (R. 244). 
Mr. Nyer stayed at home on New Year's Eve to avoid the 
crowds and drinking (R. 232). He went to bed at 1:00 a.m., but 
was awakened about a half hour to an hour later by a "crackling, 
crunching-type sound" similar to "breaking ice" (R. 232-33). The 
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third time he heard the sound, he got out of bed to investigate 
(R. 233). 
From his bathroom window he saw defendant on the fire 
escape "doing something" with Ms. Robinson's bathroom window (R. 
234-35). The fire escape landing at Ms. Robinson's back door is 
easily accessible through an emergency exit door located between 
Mr. Nyer's and Ms. Robinson's apartment. State's Exhibit 1. Mr. 
Nyer witnessed the defendant enter Ms. Robinson's back door (R. 
235-36). 
After returning to bed, Mr. Nyer heard Ms. Robinson's 
back door open and again heard the "crunching ice" noise (R. 
236). Mr. Nyer got out of bed a second time and again witnessed 
defendant doing something with Ms. Robinson's bathroom window (R. 
236) . 
Mr. Nyer then went to his front door and looked out the 
peephole (R. 236) . While looking out his peephole, he witnessed 
defendant exiting Ms. Robinson's front door onto the inside 
landing (R. 236-37). The inside landing was well-lit with two 
one hundred watt lightbulbs (R. 238), State's Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Nyer returned to his bed a third time, but 
continued to hear activity on the fire escape landing and in the 
hall (R. 238-39) . When he heard Ms. Robinson's back door open a 
third time, he looked out his bathroom window and observed the 
Venetian blinds in the victim's bathroom open revealing defendant 
inside the bathroom (R. 239) . He had a clear view of the 
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defendant when Ms. Robinson's Venetian blinds opened because the 
light was on in the bathroom (R. 239). 
Mr. Nyer also observed that the bottom half of the 
bathroom window did not have any glass remaining in it (R. 240). 
Initially, Mr. Nyer thought that the window had merely been 
opened, but then observed that perhaps the window "had been 
broken out" as it was a "two-sash sliding window that had been 
painted shut over the years" (R. 240). 
Mr. Nyer returned to his front door's peephole and 
observed the defendant leaving Ms. Robinson's apartment by the 
front door for the second time (R. 240-41). Although suspicious, 
Mr. Nyer did not immediately report the incident because he knew 
Ms. Robinson was in the process of moving, and thought perhaps 
defendant was helping her (R. 243) . Mr. Nyer never saw defendant 
carrying anything from the apartment (R. 241, 255-56). 
Mr. Nyer observed defendant wearing "brand new, fancy, 
high-tech, heavy duty" tennis shoes at the time he saw defendant 
exiting Ms. Robinson's apartment (R. 252-53). Defendant admitted 
that he had received a pair of similar shoes for Christmas, but 
claimed that the shoes had been stolen from his place of 
employment on December 26th (R. 306-07). Mr. Nyer also observed 
that defendant was wearing "gray sweat pants" (R. 252). 
Defendant's alibi witness testified that defendant was wearing 
"[a] faded pair of white-washed blue pants" (R. 299). Defendant 
similarly claimed that the night of the burglary he wore "a pair 
of stone-white pants" (R. 307). 
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When Mr. Nyer discovered that Ms. Robinson's apartment 
had been broken into, he informed her that he had seen defendant 
in her apartment (R. 244-45). After Ms. Robinson called the 
police, Mr. Nyer explained to them what he had seen the previous 
night (R. 245). 
Defendant's entire defense rested upon his testimony 
and the testimony of his live-in girlfriend, Saundra Renee 
Willson. Willson testified that she and defendant played cards 
with friends in her apartment until 11:30 or 11:45 p.m. on the 
evening of the burglary (R. 2 95). She claimed that after the 
friends left at 11:45 p.m., both she and the defendant remained 
in their apartment until she went to bed at 2:35 p.m. (R. 296-
97). The defendant also claimed that he never left his apartment 
between midnight and 3:00 a.m. on the night of the burglary (R. 
306-06, 308). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to satisfy the marshalling requirement 
by ignoring the evidence that supports the jury's guilty verdict. 
He merely reargues the evidence he presented which the jury 
rejected. Accordingly, this Court should refuse to address 
defendant's claim on appeal. However, should this Court 
determine to reach the merits of defendant's challenge, there was 
ample evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Defendant labels his argument "The Court Erred When it 
Prevented the Jury From Considering the Charge of Criminal 
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Trespass Instead of Burglary." Br. of App. at 7. While 
defendant did "request the Court to amend Count 1 of the 
Information to charge criminal trespass" (R. 317), he did not 
request a jury instruction on criminal trespass, nor is there any 
record evidence that the trial court considered or ruled on this 
issue. He has, therefore, waived its consideration on appeal. 
See Brobera v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) ("When 
there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial 
court reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake 
to consider the issue on appeal"). 
Moreover, defendant has not provided this Court with 
any legal analysis in support of the assertion that the jury 
should have considered this issue. This Court could likewise 
refuse to address this issue on that ground. See State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant 
fails to support this argument by any legal analysis or 
authority, we decline to rule on it."); accord State v. Larsen, 
828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992) ("A reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.") 
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)), aff'd. 
State v. Larsen, 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993). 
Given defendant's failure to either preserve or 
adequately brief this issue, the State will address what appears 
to be defendant's contention on appeal; that there was 
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insufficient evidence to convict him of burglary. See Br. of 
App. at 7 ("Even when the marshalled facts and inconsistencies 
are viewed in a favorable light, the prosecution's case-in-chief 
still failed to [sic] the intent required for burglary"). 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SATISFY THE MARSHALLING 
REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER, SHOULD THIS COURT 
DETERMINE TO REACH THE MERITS, THE STATE 
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO 
FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF BURGLARY. 
Defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient for 
the jury to find that he committed the offense of burglary. Br. 
of App. at 7. However, he challenges that verdict by merely 
reciting the evidence that supports his theory of the case. See 
Br. of App. at 3-6, 7-8. He has, therefore, failed to satisfy 
the marshalling requirement and this Court should refuse to 
address his claim of error. 
A. Standard of Review 
"When appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting a jury verdict in a criminal trial, this 
[Clourt 'must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict and will interfere only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Morgan. 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983)). 
Additionally, in order to successfully challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence, "defendant must 'marshal all evidence supporting 
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the jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 
470, 472 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991)); see also State v. Chavez, 840 P.2d 
846, 848 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993). 
B. Defendant Has Not Properly Marshalled the 
Evidence 
Defendant concedes that the jury correctly determined 
that he entered Ms. Robinson's apartment unlawfully. Br. of App. 
at 7, 11, 12. Despite this concession, he asserts that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury finding that he made 
that unlawful entry with the intent to commit a felony. Br. of 
App. 7-11. 
In support of his insufficiency argument, defendant 
merely reargues the evidence he presented in support of his alibi 
theory. He then compares it to the State's evidence and attempts 
to demonstrate that his evidence is more credible. His entire 
argument is that the jury "disregarded his alibi" and that the 
evidence he presented was "ignored." Br. of App. at 7-8. 
Obviously, as in every criminal jury trial where the 
defendant relies on an alibi theory and is convicted, the jury 
chose to believe the evidence presented by the State and not that 
argued by the defendant. As the supreme court stated in State v. 
Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Utah 1987), "[t]he mere existence of 
the contrary evidence does not warrant disturbing the jury's 
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verdict. . . . The jury apparently found the evidence presented 
by the State credible." Accord State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 
(Utah 1980) ("It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh 
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses . 
") 
Defendant's failure to demonstrate the State's 
evidence, when properly marshalled, is insufficient to support 
the jury's verdict is fatal to his sufficiency claim and this 
Court should refuse to consider the merits of defendant's claim 
on that ground. State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 
1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); Scheel, 823 P.2d 
at 473. 
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support 
Defendant's Conviction for Burglary 
Even if this Court determines to address the merits of 
defendant's claim, the State presented ample evidence to support 
the jury's determination of guilt. Given defendant's concession 
that he entered the victim's apartment unlawfully, Br. of App. at 
7, 11, 12, the State will only address the sufficiency of the 
evidence as it relates to defendant's intent at the time of that 
unlawful entry. 
The evidence demonstrated that the victim and victim's 
roommate both reported the theft of stereo equipment (R. 270, 
282). Denise Robinson remembered using the equipment the night 
of the break-in at about 1:15 a.m. (R. 269-71). The equipment 
was missing when she returned to her apartment at 3:00-3:15 a.m. 
(R. 269-70). During this two hour period, an eyewitness observed 
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defendant inside or entering and exiting the apartment three 
different times (R. 235-36, 236-37, 239, 240-41). 
In order to convict defendant of burglary, the jury 
need only find that defendant possessed the intent to commit a 
theft or other felony at the time of his entry into Denise 
Robinson's apartment; not that the theft be completed. See Utah 
Code Ann, § 76-6-202 (1990). While defendant correctly states 
the rule that !t[t]he unlawful entry into private premises may not 
alone support a finding of intent[,]" Br. of App. at 9 (quoting 
State v, Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)), he 
ignores the evidence outlined above and that "[ijntent may be 
difficult to prove but can be inferred." State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 1071, 1072 (Utah 1989),2 
Additionally, since 1886, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that unlawful entry combined with other factors is 
sufficient to infer the requisite intent for burglary and the 
fact that nothing was stolen, or found missing, is irrelevant to 
that determination. See People v. Morton, 11 P. 512, 513 (Utah 
1886) ("it would seem impossible to account for the presence of 
the appellants at that store that night upon any reasonable 
hypothesis other than that they were there to steal. The 
conclusion is irresistible."); Roaerson v. Harris, 178 P.2d 397, 
399 (Utah 1947) ("The crime of burglary was perpetrated by the 
plaintiff's entering the garage with intent to steal. Had he 
been interrupted and prevented from taking the car, or, after 
entering, had he changed his mind and decided not to take the 
automobile, he still would have committed the crime of 
burglary,"); State v. Tellav. 324 P.2d 490, 491 (Utah 1958) (even 
though nothing found missing in store, "a reasonable inference 
from the evidence is that the entry was made for the purpose of 
committing larceny or some other felony. Intent is usually 
proved by acts and conduct."); State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486, 
487 (Utah 1961) ("authorities uniformly affirm that where one 
breaks and enters into the dwelling of another in the nighttime, 
without the latter's consent, an inference may be drawn that he 
did so to commit larceny."); State v. Svddall, 433 P.2d 10, 11 
(Utah 1967) (In order to convict of burglary, "[t]he evidence 
(continued...) 
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Defendant asserts that the jury's acquittal on the 
theft charge means that the jury could not have found the 
requisite intent for burglary. Br. of App. at 10. However, as 
the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. 
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984): 
"'The most that can be said in such cases is 
that the verdict shows that either in the 
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not 
speak their real conclusions, but that does 
not show that they were not convinced of the 
defendant's guilt. We interpret the 
acquittal as no more than their assumption of 
a power which they had no right to exercise, 
but to which they were disposed through 
lenity.'" 
Id. (quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 
1925)) (in turn quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 
(1932)). Similarly, the acquittal in this case may have been 
2(...continued) 
need not show that a larceny or other felony was in fact 
committed on the premises entered, but it is sufficient if the 
evidence shows that at the time of the entry the defendants had 
the intention to commit the larceny or some other felony."); 
State v. Clements, 488 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971) ("The trier of the 
facts could hardly have failed to believe that the defendant in 
entering the clinic near midnight did so with the intent to 
steal."); State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981) ("When 
one breaks and enters a building in the nighttime, without 
consent, an inference may be drawn that he did so to commit 
larceny. The fact that nothing was missing when defendant was 
apprehended is no defense to the burglary charge; nor does it 
destroy the inference of intent to steal at the time of entry."); 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981) ("the authorities 
uniformly agree that where one breaks and enters the dwelling of 
another in the nighttime, without the latter's consent, an 
inference may be drawn that he did so to commit larceny."); State 
v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985) ("Defendant's intent 
to commit a theft may be inferred from the circumstances of the 
break-in. The fact that nothing was missing when he was 
apprehended is no defense to the burglary charge, nor does it 
destroy the inference of intent to steal at the time of entry."). 
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motivated by any number of reasons. Those unknown motivations do 
not mean there was insufficient evidence to find the intent to 
commit theft or another felony beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Furthermore, as illustrated in note 2, supra, the supreme court 
has consistently held that even if a theft is not committed, the 
jury may reasonably find the intent needed to commit burglary. 
Moreover, the jury's guilty verdict indicates that it 
clearly found that defendant possessed the requisite intent for 
the commission of either theft or another felony when he 
unlawfully entered the victim's apartment. Defendant's unlawful 
entry combined with the smashed bathroom window, the missing 
stereo equipment and defendant's failure to explain his presence 
inside the apartment provided ample support for the jury's 
finding. The jury correctly found that this intent combined with 
the unlawful entry satisfied the elements of burglary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant fails to satisfy the marshalling requirement 
by merely rearguing the evidence rejected by the jury. This 
Court should therefore refuse to address his claim on appeal. 
However, if this Court determines to reach the merits of 
defendant's argument, the State presented sufficient evidence to 
convict defendant of burglary. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
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